Promoting Chinese Enterprise Innovation: Theory and Practice

Xiaoxuan Liu

doi:doi:10.11648/j.si.20221004.14

| Peer-Reviewed

Promoting Chinese Enterprise Innovation: Theory and Practice

Xiaoxuan Liu

Published in Science Innovation (Volume 10, Issue 4)

Received: 8 May 2022 Accepted: 28 July 2022 Published: 29 July 2022

Views: Downloads:

Download PDF

Share This Article

Twitter
Linked In
Facebook

Abstract

China's economic growth mainly relied on quantitative expansion and technical imitation. However, when the economy develops to a certain stage, this late-mover advantage no longer exists. High-quality economic growth requires innovation, and innovation needs to be achieved through the optimal governance mechanism of enterprises. This paper demonstrates theoretically how to discover the innovation mechanism of the enterprise, so that the entrepreneur's ability to obtain full use rights, that is, the ability to use key resources, may be a better incentive mechanism than the full ownership. The intangible human capital invested by entrepreneurs in the enterprise can only realize its value through residual rights. Without various supporting use rights or decision-making rights around the core residual rights, new value cannot be created. The core theory of corporate governance absorbed by this paper solves the shortcomings of traditional theories. It is neither the classical theory of “capital is mattered” and the planning model of “power is mattered”, nor is it a model of bureaucratic capital that mixes the two, but highlights Only by “people-oriented”, marketization liberates people, and empowering entrepreneurs with access and control rights, can their potential be maximized. At the same time, cultivating a market environment of fair competition, strengthen the improvement of capital market and all others factor market have a high degree of urgency for enterprise innovation, otherwise innovation will be difficult to achieve, and enterprises will not have the growth soil for healthy development.

Published in	Science Innovation (Volume 10, Issue 4)
DOI	10.11648/j.si.20221004.14
Page(s)	124-128
Creative Commons	This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, provided the original work is properly cited.
Copyright	Copyright © The Author(s), 2024. Published by Science Publishing Group

Keywords

Innovation, Entrepreneurship, Corporate Governance, Access, Optimal Control Allocation, Capital Markets

References

[1]	Solow, Robert “Technical Change and Aggregate Production Function”, Review of Economics and Statistics, 1957, p312-320.
[2]	Jorgenson, Dale W. Frank Gollop, and Barbara Fraumeni “Productivity and U.S. Economic Growth”, Cambridge, Mass. Harvard University Press, 1987.
[3]	熊彼特《经济发展理论》, 商务印书馆, 1990年。
[4]	J Filippo Belloc “Corporate Governance and Innovation: A Survey”, Journal of Economic Surveys (2012) Vol. 26, No. 5, pp. 835–864.
[5]	鲍莫尔《企业家精神》, 武汉大学出版社, 2010年。
[6]	Alessandro Zattoni“Who Should Control a Corporation? Toward a Contingency Stakeholder Model for Allocating Ownership Rights”, Journal of Business Ethics (2011) 103: 255-274.
[7]	Oliver Hart“Incomplete Contracts and Control”The American Economic Review, JULY 2017, Vol. 107, No. 7 (JULY 2017), pp. 1731-1752.
[8]	Grossman, S. and Hart, O. “The costs and the benefits of ownership: A theory of vertical and lateral integration”, Journal of Political Economy (1986) 94: 691-719.
[9]	G. Raja & Luigi Zingales “Power in a Theory of the Firm” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 113, No. 2 (May, 1998), pp. 387-432.
[10]	杨小凯“企业理论的新发展”，《经济研究》1994年第7期。
[11]	Luigi Zingales “Corporate Governance”, NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES 6309, December 1997, http://www.nber.org/papers/w6309, NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH, forthcoming in The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law.
[12]	Daniel W. Elfenbein and Josh Lerner “Exclusivity, Contingent Control Rights, and the Design of Internet Portal Alliances”, Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, April 2012, Vol. 28, No. 1 (April 2012), pp. 45-76.
[13]	G. Rajan “Presidential Address: The Corporation in Finance” Journal of Finance 2012 67 (4): 1173-1217.
[14]	Raghuram G. Rajan Luigi Zingales “Financial Dependence and Growth” The American Economic Review, Vol. 88, No. 3. (Jun., 1998), pp. 559-586.

Cite This Article

Plain Text BibTeX RIS

APA Style

Xiaoxuan Liu. (2022). Promoting Chinese Enterprise Innovation: Theory and Practice. Science Innovation, 10(4), 124-128. https://doi.org/10.11648/j.si.20221004.14

Copy | Download

ACS Style

Xiaoxuan Liu. Promoting Chinese Enterprise Innovation: Theory and Practice. Sci. Innov. 2022, 10(4), 124-128. doi: 10.11648/j.si.20221004.14

Copy | Download

AMA Style

Xiaoxuan Liu. Promoting Chinese Enterprise Innovation: Theory and Practice. Sci Innov. 2022;10(4):124-128. doi: 10.11648/j.si.20221004.14

Copy | Download

@article{10.11648/j.si.20221004.14,
  author = {Xiaoxuan Liu},
  title = {Promoting Chinese Enterprise Innovation: Theory and Practice},
  journal = {Science Innovation},
  volume = {10},
  number = {4},
  pages = {124-128},
  doi = {10.11648/j.si.20221004.14},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.11648/j.si.20221004.14},
  eprint = {https://article.sciencepublishinggroup.com/pdf/10.11648.j.si.20221004.14},
  abstract = {China's economic growth mainly relied on quantitative expansion and technical imitation. However, when the economy develops to a certain stage, this late-mover advantage no longer exists. High-quality economic growth requires innovation, and innovation needs to be achieved through the optimal governance mechanism of enterprises. This paper demonstrates theoretically how to discover the innovation mechanism of the enterprise, so that the entrepreneur's ability to obtain full use rights, that is, the ability to use key resources, may be a better incentive mechanism than the full ownership. The intangible human capital invested by entrepreneurs in the enterprise can only realize its value through residual rights. Without various supporting use rights or decision-making rights around the core residual rights, new value cannot be created. The core theory of corporate governance absorbed by this paper solves the shortcomings of traditional theories. It is neither the classical theory of “capital is mattered” and the planning model of “power is mattered”, nor is it a model of bureaucratic capital that mixes the two, but highlights Only by “people-oriented”, marketization liberates people, and empowering entrepreneurs with access and control rights, can their potential be maximized. At the same time, cultivating a market environment of fair competition, strengthen the improvement of capital market and all others factor market have a high degree of urgency for enterprise innovation, otherwise innovation will be difficult to achieve, and enterprises will not have the growth soil for healthy development.},
 year = {2022}
}

Copy | Download

TY  - JOUR
T1  - Promoting Chinese Enterprise Innovation: Theory and Practice
AU  - Xiaoxuan Liu
Y1  - 2022/07/29
PY  - 2022
N1  - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.si.20221004.14
DO  - 10.11648/j.si.20221004.14
T2  - Science Innovation
JF  - Science Innovation
JO  - Science Innovation
SP  - 124
EP  - 128
PB  - Science Publishing Group
SN  - 2328-787X
UR  - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.si.20221004.14
AB  - China's economic growth mainly relied on quantitative expansion and technical imitation. However, when the economy develops to a certain stage, this late-mover advantage no longer exists. High-quality economic growth requires innovation, and innovation needs to be achieved through the optimal governance mechanism of enterprises. This paper demonstrates theoretically how to discover the innovation mechanism of the enterprise, so that the entrepreneur's ability to obtain full use rights, that is, the ability to use key resources, may be a better incentive mechanism than the full ownership. The intangible human capital invested by entrepreneurs in the enterprise can only realize its value through residual rights. Without various supporting use rights or decision-making rights around the core residual rights, new value cannot be created. The core theory of corporate governance absorbed by this paper solves the shortcomings of traditional theories. It is neither the classical theory of “capital is mattered” and the planning model of “power is mattered”, nor is it a model of bureaucratic capital that mixes the two, but highlights Only by “people-oriented”, marketization liberates people, and empowering entrepreneurs with access and control rights, can their potential be maximized. At the same time, cultivating a market environment of fair competition, strengthen the improvement of capital market and all others factor market have a high degree of urgency for enterprise innovation, otherwise innovation will be difficult to achieve, and enterprises will not have the growth soil for healthy development.
VL  - 10
IS  - 4
ER  -

Copy | Download

Author Information

Xiaoxuan Liu

The Institute of Economics, Chinese Academy of Social Science, Beijing, China

Download PDF

Sections

Plain Text BibTeX RIS

APA Style

Xiaoxuan Liu. (2022). Promoting Chinese Enterprise Innovation: Theory and Practice. Science Innovation, 10(4), 124-128. https://doi.org/10.11648/j.si.20221004.14

Copy | Download

ACS Style

Xiaoxuan Liu. Promoting Chinese Enterprise Innovation: Theory and Practice. Sci. Innov. 2022, 10(4), 124-128. doi: 10.11648/j.si.20221004.14

Copy | Download

AMA Style

Xiaoxuan Liu. Promoting Chinese Enterprise Innovation: Theory and Practice. Sci Innov. 2022;10(4):124-128. doi: 10.11648/j.si.20221004.14

Copy | Download

@article{10.11648/j.si.20221004.14,
  author = {Xiaoxuan Liu},
  title = {Promoting Chinese Enterprise Innovation: Theory and Practice},
  journal = {Science Innovation},
  volume = {10},
  number = {4},
  pages = {124-128},
  doi = {10.11648/j.si.20221004.14},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.11648/j.si.20221004.14},
  eprint = {https://article.sciencepublishinggroup.com/pdf/10.11648.j.si.20221004.14},
  abstract = {China's economic growth mainly relied on quantitative expansion and technical imitation. However, when the economy develops to a certain stage, this late-mover advantage no longer exists. High-quality economic growth requires innovation, and innovation needs to be achieved through the optimal governance mechanism of enterprises. This paper demonstrates theoretically how to discover the innovation mechanism of the enterprise, so that the entrepreneur's ability to obtain full use rights, that is, the ability to use key resources, may be a better incentive mechanism than the full ownership. The intangible human capital invested by entrepreneurs in the enterprise can only realize its value through residual rights. Without various supporting use rights or decision-making rights around the core residual rights, new value cannot be created. The core theory of corporate governance absorbed by this paper solves the shortcomings of traditional theories. It is neither the classical theory of “capital is mattered” and the planning model of “power is mattered”, nor is it a model of bureaucratic capital that mixes the two, but highlights Only by “people-oriented”, marketization liberates people, and empowering entrepreneurs with access and control rights, can their potential be maximized. At the same time, cultivating a market environment of fair competition, strengthen the improvement of capital market and all others factor market have a high degree of urgency for enterprise innovation, otherwise innovation will be difficult to achieve, and enterprises will not have the growth soil for healthy development.},
 year = {2022}
}

Copy | Download

TY  - JOUR
T1  - Promoting Chinese Enterprise Innovation: Theory and Practice
AU  - Xiaoxuan Liu
Y1  - 2022/07/29
PY  - 2022
N1  - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.si.20221004.14
DO  - 10.11648/j.si.20221004.14
T2  - Science Innovation
JF  - Science Innovation
JO  - Science Innovation
SP  - 124
EP  - 128
PB  - Science Publishing Group
SN  - 2328-787X
UR  - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.si.20221004.14
AB  - China's economic growth mainly relied on quantitative expansion and technical imitation. However, when the economy develops to a certain stage, this late-mover advantage no longer exists. High-quality economic growth requires innovation, and innovation needs to be achieved through the optimal governance mechanism of enterprises. This paper demonstrates theoretically how to discover the innovation mechanism of the enterprise, so that the entrepreneur's ability to obtain full use rights, that is, the ability to use key resources, may be a better incentive mechanism than the full ownership. The intangible human capital invested by entrepreneurs in the enterprise can only realize its value through residual rights. Without various supporting use rights or decision-making rights around the core residual rights, new value cannot be created. The core theory of corporate governance absorbed by this paper solves the shortcomings of traditional theories. It is neither the classical theory of “capital is mattered” and the planning model of “power is mattered”, nor is it a model of bureaucratic capital that mixes the two, but highlights Only by “people-oriented”, marketization liberates people, and empowering entrepreneurs with access and control rights, can their potential be maximized. At the same time, cultivating a market environment of fair competition, strengthen the improvement of capital market and all others factor market have a high degree of urgency for enterprise innovation, otherwise innovation will be difficult to achieve, and enterprises will not have the growth soil for healthy development.
VL  - 10
IS  - 4
ER  -

Copy | Download